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S U M M A R Y
Background: In May 2015, South Korea reported its ﬁrst case of Middle East respiratory syndrome
coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection in a 68-year-old man with a history of travel in the Middle East. In the
presence of secondary infections, an understanding of the transmission dynamics of the virus is crucial.
The aim of this study was to characterize the transmission chains of MERS-CoV infection in the current
South Korean outbreak.
Methods: Individual-level data from multiple sources were collected and used for epidemiological
analyses.
Results: As of July 14, 2015, 185 conﬁrmed cases of MERS have been reported in the Korean outbreak.
Three generations of secondary infection, with over half belonging to the second generation, could be
delineated. Hospital infection was found to be the most important cause of virus transmission, affecting
largely non-healthcare workers (154/184). Healthcare switching has probably accounted for the
emergence of multiple generations of secondary infection. Fomite transmission may explain a signiﬁcant
proportion of the infections occurring in the absence of direct contact with infected cases.
Conclusions: Publicly available data from multiple sources, including the media, are useful to describe
the epidemic history of an outbreak. The effective control of MERS-CoV hinges on the upholding of
infection control standards and an understanding of health-seeking behaviours in the community.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International Society for Infectious Diseases.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/4.0/).
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Since its discovery in Saudi Arabia in mid-2012, Middle East
respiratory syndrome (MERS) has continued to be reported
following exposure to infected camels and human contact in the
healthcare setting, almost exclusively in Middle Eastern countries.
There have, however, been subsequent reports of virus transmis-
sion outside the Arabian Peninsula in the 3 years since (Iran,
Tunisia, UK, France, Italy, and USA).1 Globally, since September
2012, the World Health Organization (WHO) has been notiﬁed of
1368 laboratory-conﬁrmed cases of MERS coronavirus (MERS-
CoV) infection, including at least 490 related deaths.2
On May 20, 2015, South Korea reported its ﬁrst conﬁrmed case
of MERS-CoV infection in a 68-year-old man who had a history of
travel in the Middle East,3 which was followed by chains of* Corresponding author. Tel.: +852 22528812; fax: +852 26354977.
E-mail address: sslee@cuhk.edu.hk (S.S. Lee).
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1201-9712/ 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International So
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).secondary infection. As of July 14, 2015, a total of 186 MERS-CoV
cases, including 36 deaths, have been reported to the WHO.2
MERS-CoV infection is of particular concern worldwide, not just
because of its similarity to the severe acute respiratory syndrome
coronavirus (SARS-CoV) that hit Hong Kong and other countries in
2003, but also the importance of translating former lessons to
improve infectious disease control. As tertiary, quaternary, and
quinary spread of MERS-CoV have been described in outbreaks in
the Middle East,4 an understanding of the transmission dynamics
of MERS-CoV in the current outbreak would contribute to the
epidemiological knowledgebase for future reference.
The aim of this study was to characterize the transmission
chains of MERS-CoV infection in the current South Korean
outbreak, using publicly available data.
2. Methods
Individual-level data on infected patients from multiple sources
were collected, matched, and collated to develop epidemiologicalciety for Infectious Diseases. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
S.S. Lee, N.S. Wong / International Journal of Infectious Diseases 38 (2015) 65–6766analyses. These open access data sources included the following:
World Health Organization updates (http://www.who.int/csr/
disease/coronavirus_infections/en/), ProMED-mail (http://www.
promedmail.org/), Centre for Health Protection updates (http://
www.chp.gov.hk), and FluTrackers (https://ﬂutrackers.com).
3. Results
As of July 14, 2015, 185 conﬁrmed cases of MERS (mean age
54.6 years, male to female ratio 1.6:1) have been reported in South
Korea (excluding one diagnosed in China). Secondary cases were
classiﬁed as ﬁrst-generation infections if there was a history of
direct contact with the index patient (through visiting or the
provision of care), or exposure in the same healthcare environment
where the index patient was clinically managed. Similarly, second-
generation infections refer to those with exposure to ﬁrst-
generation patients.
Of the 86 healthcare institutions that have taken in MERS-CoV-
infected patients, local transmission has occurred in 13 (plus an
ambulance), as shown in Figure 1. A majority of the transmitted
infections have been reported from two hospitals, accounting for
19.5% (n = 36) and 48.4% (n = 89) of all cases. Of note, 99 patients
could not give a deﬁnitive history of direct contact with any
infected persons, but had been staying in the same clinical
environment with known case(s). Three generations of secondary
infection could be delineated over time: ﬁrst-generation (n = 26),
second-generation (n = 120), and third-generation (n = 22); eight
patients could not be classiﬁed. Three overlapping waves of
transmission could be seen on the epidemic curve (Figure 2).Figure 1. Chain transmission of reported MERS-CoV cases in South Korea as differentia
location, i.e. the healthcare institutions, with solid circles (* in different colours) represe
in different colours) who were infected before transfer to the implicated institution. Lett
after excluding 9 unclassiﬁed ones. The National Designated Medical Centre ‘N’ was seMapping highlighted a number of characteristics of the
outbreak. Firstly, infection within households was distinctly
uncommon, accounting for only one ﬁrst-generation case (wife
of the index patient). Hospital infection was found to be the most
important cause of the outbreak, but affected largely non-
healthcare workers (154/184 from the collected data); there has
been no reported community spread. Secondly, the transmissions
appear to have been multifocal as a result of infected patients
attending more than one institution during the course of their
illness. Two cases, including the index case, were reported to have
visited four healthcare institutions, while three had visited three.
This can be explained by the phenomenon of healthcare switching,
a practice that is common in South Korea, where many adult
patients may use hospital performance information to choose the
service providers.5,6 This practice, coupled with the courtesy of
visiting relatives in hospitals, appears to have fuelled the rapid
dissemination of the virus. Thirdly, while MERS-CoV is known to
spread by droplet transmission upon prolonged exposure to and
within a short distance of source patients, direct contact could only
be inferred in about 10% of the cases. It was found that the majority
occurred instead in people who had shared the same healthcare
environment. Fomite transmission is a possibility, as MERS-CoV
has been shown to remain viable on inanimate surfaces, even after
an extended interval of 48 h.7 Similarly SARS-CoV RNA has been
collected from hospital surfaces days after their deposition by
infected patients, although the viability of this virus could not be
conﬁrmed.8 Fomite transmission was the probable explanation for
the transmission of SARS-CoV to passengers not in physical
proximity to the source patient on an aircraft,9 an observation thatted by the respective generations of secondary infection (as of July 14, 2015) and
nting incident cases who contracted the virus from source patients (& solid squares
ers A to I denote hospitals, while the numbers (1–177) are codes given to each case,
t up by the Government to take in conﬁrmed MERS cases.
Figure 2. Epidemic curve showing the reported numbers of cases by generation (n = 177, excluding unclassiﬁed cases) against time, as of July 14, 2015.
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Korea.
4. Discussion
Data collected from different publicly available sources, including
the media, are useful to describe the epidemic history of the Korean
MERS-CoV outbreak, which has affected multiple healthcare
institutions. The analysis could be conducted readily without relying
on the lengthy process of consulting ofﬁcial surveillance reports. A
similar approach has also enabled another research group to report
their preliminary assessment of the outbreak, an effort that would
not have been possible before the internet era.10 There is, inevitably,
the limitation of the validity of the epidemiological characteristics of
each reported case, although much effort was made to verify the data
in the course of the study. In fact the demographic proﬁle of cases in
the present study is similar to that subsequently released by the
South Korean Ministry of Health (in Korean, machine translated,
edited: http://www.mw.go.kr/front_new/al/sal0301ls.jsp?PAR_
MENU_ID=04&MENU_ID=0403). Overall, the present results suggest
that effective control of MERS-CoV hinges on the upholding of
infection control standards to minimize the emergence of new
generations of the virus and on advising the avoidance of healthcare
switching when there is a suspected infection.
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